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Abstract. The everyday life of people working in organizations requires con-
tinuous coordination. In fact, coordination is what organizations are for. Yet 
people do not stick to what the organization prescribes for them to do. Human 
coordination is rife with issues of group affiliation, power, and leadership, and 
associated emotions. The fields of organizational behaviour and management 
reflect this. Modellers of organizational behaviour need to take these areas on 
board. This goes beyond formal organization. While sophisticated logics are 
used as well as intricate models of organizations, the social, volitional nature of 
the humans in them is hardly modelled, thus limiting the practical usability of 
these models. The article reviews the literature on group affiliation and hierar-
chy in agent-based models. It gives pointers as to which developments seem 
promising for advancing MAS and social simulation. It discusses the potential 
of complementary roles in agent-based models for formal organisation and hu-
man social nature. The MAIA meta-model for social simulation [7] serves as an 
example. 
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1 Introduction 
Many agent-based models (ABM), virtual humans and robots have the aim to sup-
port coordinated tasks in human organizations. To date, the social, volitional side that 
is crucial to any human endeavour is not fully taken on board by these models. This 
was recently argued by Kaminka [1], who pleads for curing robot autism, which he 
mainly defines in the physical world, and by Dignum et al. [2] who call for agents that 
are social at their core; they use the term ‘social landscape’ to denote this. The agents 
live in a social landscape defined by ties of group affiliation and hierarchical rela-
tions. In a keynote, Gilbert [3] explains why coordination is so difficult to model. He 
defines it as ‘the state of working together’ and states that coordination can be based 
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on cooperation or competition. Implicitly he raises two central questions of social life: 
who’s friends – with whom will I cooperate, and who’s boss – who decides. This 
article is about these two questions known by many names. We shall use the terms 
group affiliation and hierarchy. They have been central to the study of human social 
behaviour in organizations, ranging from theoretical to consultancy-oriented. The 
common denominator in this work is that people are social creatures driven by voli-
tion. Groups, relationships, and hierarchy are always prime determinants of how peo-
ple behave, along with context- and task-specific matters. This makes sense. In an 
evolutionary as well as an ontogenetic sense, we are social primates – children, par-
ents, friends, citizens - before being members of formal organizations. Affiliation and 
hierarchy are crucial to humans, as they are to other social animals, whatever they do. 
Theoretical frameworks in social science explicitly mention an affiliation-related and 
a hierarchy-related dimension of social life [4-6]. Yet little of this has transpired to 
multi-agent systems (MAS) to date.  
This article tries to make a general statement that could apply to a wide range of 
ABM and MAS. “ABM” for agent-based systems and “MAS” for multi-agent sys-
tems are two research fields that overlap. ABM tends to model large numbers of sim-
ple agents and their emergent dynamics whereas MAS tends to model smaller num-
bers of agents with quite a bit of internal cognitive complexity. Here we use both 
terms as near-synonyms, under the idea that the field may converge if they have the 
common mission of modelling coordination. Hence the “agent societies” in the title.  
This wide ambition bears the risk of vagueness. Just so as to give the argument 
some focus, let us take as an example a state-of-the art system that is much more so-
cially aware than most. The MAIA [7] framework is a meta-model for building ABM 
or MAS based on Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis and Development framework. The 
framework provides modelling concepts to capture a large range of social phenomena. 
The MAIA architecture is built from five “structures”: collective (actors that stand for 
people or organizations), constitutional (“the social context”), physical, operational 
(dynamics), evaluative (outcomes). MAIA conceptualizes agents as having properties 
(e.g. risk propensity), personal values (e.g. corruption), belongings, information, and 
intrinsic behaviours (e.g. requiring energy). Agents make decisions about the tasks 
they perform and every decision requires a criterion. The case used as an instance is 
that of a boss’s willingness to hire children instead of adults in the recycle industry in 
India. The criterion hinges on the risk-taking variable and on a binary corruption vari-
able. The constitutional structure states that every actor takes a role in the society, and 
that every actor has a specific objective specified to that role. A role is defined as an 
abstract representation of a set of activities that are performed according to some rules 
in order to reach social objectives (e.g. increase of income). The objective is defined 
as the expected result of a role. 
While this is an impressively rich description, it only addresses the two social di-
mensions of affiliation and hierarchy inasmuch as they are formally specified in roles. 
In reality, formal organizations never fully match informal social ties; the social fabric 
around the organization will be all-important. MAIA agents have no family relations, 
for instance. This makes it hard to model aspects of the real-world situation that are 
crucial to those they concern. As an example, suppose a boss hires the children of his 
3 
 
relatives to work for him. The MAIA model instance calls this corruption, yet it could 
be perceived as a moral duty to assist relatives by a real boss, depending on the nature 
of affiliation and hierarchy in that society. If the society has poor standard of living, 
poor institutions but strong family loyalties, and if people are willing to subjugate 
their destinies to the will of parents and rulers, then the law is unlikely to carry any 
power. Actual power will depend on informal hierarchy in the local context, for in-
stance, related to caste or class. A local ruler may be perceived as more moral if he 
provides child labour opportunities than if he does not.  
So the “social context” of MAIA’s constitutional structure is, for the moment, lim-
ited to formal roles, rules and dependencies. Incidentally, the article’s authors are the 
first to point out that many areas for improvement remain. 
How could such a social structure for MAIA, or for any other model, look? There 
is a wealth of studies in agent-based systems that address coordination. In this paper 
we review this literature, aiming for breadth rather than detail, to see how it can help 
the MAS / ABM community. Some of the literature might not be applicable to the 
MAIA case, but could be applicable to readers’ studies. 
2 Coordination in agent-based models 
A vast corpus of agent-based literature has been written about coordination in humans 
and other animals. An extensive set of references, for which there is no space in the 
article, can be obtained from the authors. In the following we have selected some 
references for more detailed discussion because we deem them particularly interesting 
for the MAS and social simulation community.  
It may be useful to point out that we think of the areas of affiliation and hierarchy as 
more general than some of the topics that have been the subject of streams of research 
in agent-based work, such as coalition formation or opinion dynamics. Such areas are 
special cases, and the agents in the models on these issues may or may not be moti-
vated by group dynamics and hierarchy. This is no value judgement; it can actually be 
quite valuable to use ABM for checking whether group patterns can emerge without 
any pre-existing group-based or hierarchical motivation on the part of the agents; see 
e.g. the overview by Squazzoni et al. [8]. However, consciousness of group identity 
and hierarchy matter to people, and are basic tenets of social science. Our interest 
here is in the generic nature of group affiliation and hierarchy for any task of coordi-
nation that may be set to agents. How can these generic tendencies be modelled in 
tractable ways? Note that for coordination to occur, typically a variety of people and 
roles are needed; the step from affiliation and hierarchy to coordination is by no 
means self-evident.  
 
2.1 Group affiliation 
People and other animals organize themselves in groups, ranging from societies to 
communities, clans, clubs, and families. In interaction they negotiate who belongs to 
the group and who does not. These groups in turn define one’s identity and self-
esteem and consequently, behaviour. Group affiliation mechanisms are implemented 
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at different levels, from world regions to small groups, from abstract to specific. 
Group boundaries are therefore defined by varying concepts and theories. Table 1 
summarizes the literature.  
The simplest form of affiliation does not even deal with group affiliation, but only 
with proximity. It is a form of distributed cognition that is often called swarms or 
crowds. Agents perceive a limited set of neighbours and are influenced only by their 
behaviour. Imitation is the typical response. Quite a bit of work has been done on 
animals. Here we just mention recent experimental work by Couzin et al [9] that 
shows how, if a swarm of fish has alternative destinations, the presence of individuals 
without any preference can have the self-organizing effect of dampening the influence 
of minorities with a vehement preference for one destination in favour of majorities 
with a mild preference for the other destination. Thus, by implication, large fractions 
of uninterested individuals can limit the power of extremists without any symbolic 
affiliation of hierarchy, but just through self-organisation. 
 
Table 1: Themes in ABM on group affiliation. 
 
The most abstract form of group boundaries applied in ABMs, mainly innovation 
studies, are social networks. This concept posits ‘connections’ between agents. The 
group boundary within these models is defined by the number of others the agent is 
connected to. Some concepts that are based on this social interaction restriction are 
word-of-mouth; contagion; imitation; strong and weak ties; and opinion leaders. In 
the case of imitation, mechanisms are often combined with individual (heterogeneous) 
preferences or thresholds, such as a match with individual preference regarding the 
action [10-12] or sensitivity to peer pressure [13-15] e.g. due to uncertainty, concep-
tualized in the Consumat Framework [16].  
 
A more specific group boundary is homophily, which refers to the similarity be-
tween agents as a restriction rule for socially influenced behaviour. Note that more 
similar does not necessarily mean more attractive; there could be nonlinear relation-
ships between the two. Some famous evolutionary type ABMs are based on this prin-
ciple, such as the model by Axelrod on the evolution of culture [17], Schelling on 
Level of 
detail 
Concepts & Theories Mechanisms 
Swarms  Proximity Imitation  
Social 
Networks 
Contagion; word-of-mouth; opin-
ion leaders; strong and weak ties; 
Social comparison theory 
Imitation; imitation via 
thresholds or preferences; 
imitation due to uncertainty 
Homophily Strong and weak ties Similarity between agents; 
familiarity 
Multiple 
group 
identities 
Theory of Planned Behaviour (sub-
jective norm); Theory of interper-
sonal behaviour 
Weighted peer judgment; 
commitment vs membership 
5 
 
segregation [18], Sakoda on two-group dynamics [19]  and Riolo et al. on cooperation 
[20]. This principle has been applied in several land use and land cover change mod-
els [21-23], where agents decision for a new residential location is partly based on 
neighbours’ similarity with personal characteristics.  
Models on opinion dynamics apply the same mechanism, but with more complexi-
ty. The first opinion dynamic models used binary, linear opinion models. Here the 
opinion of an agent is dependent on the weight the agent attaches to the opinion of his 
opponent. The weights can be static or dynamic, which means they can also depend 
on time or on the opinion itself. In the static case, the weights are part of the agent’s 
initial profile and determine whether they put a positive or negative weight on another 
agent’s opinion. In this case the weights of an opinion do not change over time.  
A variation to this model is an opinion model under social influence. Here the 
agent adheres to his initial opinion by a certain value g, and is influenced by 1 – g: i.e. 
agents differ in their susceptibility to other agent’s opinions and the weights they put 
on another agent’s opinion. Here, susceptibility to another agent’s opinion is given as 
a personality trait, i.e. it does not depend on the characteristics of the other agent. 
Lastly, the weight to a certain opinion can also be dependent on time.  
In agent-based models of opinion dynamics, agents have continuous opinions 
which they can adjust due to interaction with other agents and importantly based, 
adjustments are based on the similarity in opinion between agents. Here, social influ-
ence is dependent on the similarity in opinion between agent i and j. Two models that 
have pioneered opinion dynamics in the agent-based model’s research, and that stud-
ied what would happen if the weights of a certain opinion are dependent on the opin-
ion itself, are the models by Hegselmann and Krause [24], and Deffuant et al [25]. 
They both use opinion averaging through interaction. In the Deffuant-Weisbuch mod-
el, the modellers use pairwise interaction for averaging opinions, while in the 
Hegselmann-Krause model, the modellers use the average of the opinion of all other 
agents that lie in the agent’s area of confidence [26].  
  
The third level of detail is rare in ABM, despite being the rule in real life. These 
models use group boundaries. A pioneering model is the checkerboard model of so-
cial interaction by Sakoda[19]. Sakoda’s agents walk around in a square world. They 
belong to two ‘social identities’, and per model run they have fixed preferences for 
members of their own, and the other identity. Depending on the set of preferences 
they can e.g. merge, separate, keep pursuing one another, or form cross-group dyads.  
Several ABMs, especially in innovation diffusion research, apply Ajzen’s [27] 
Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) [10, 28]. This theory suggests that a persons’ 
intention towards engaging in behaviour increases when important reference groups 
(e.g. family, friends, colleagues) are likely to approve the action, also termed the sub-
jective norm. This theory assumes that varying group identities play an important role 
in behavioural outcomes. Kaufmann et al. [28] indirectly model multiple group identi-
ties by using empirical data on the subjective norm. A promising agent framework by 
Feola and Binder [29], the integrative agent-centred framework (IAC), also indirectly 
accounts for multiple group identities by allowing for multiple roles with associated 
norms, and reference groups’ opinion. A model that combines two reference groups, 
6 
 
although not explicitly stated, is the model by Valeeva and Verwaart on udder health 
management improvement [30]. Here, a farmer’s behaviour towards adopting an ud-
der health measure is influenced by three different types of information from three 
different sources: legislation, information campaigns from companies and govern-
ment, and other farmers.  
A full focus on group dynamics is brought into the discussion by Prada and Paiva 
[31]. Their model includes both membership of groups and relative power. Agents 
engaged in collaborative tasks with humans, who developed more trust in these agents 
than in socially naïve agents. Ongoing work explores similar ideas. Degens et al. [32] 
apply the notion of a “moral circle” as a building block of social structure for agents. 
Mascarenhas et al. [33] operationalize Kemper’s notion of status claims and confer-
rals as constitutive elements of social interaction. Before agents can make relational 
claims on others, they have to build appropriate status, called “social importance”. 
2.2 Hierarchy 
Social hierarchy is a ubiquitous feature in humans and animals. Individuals are 
never identical and resources are scarce. Hierarchy can have a clear advantage in 
groups. It can help avoid costs for aggression, e.g. when individuals have to compete 
for resources. It can also help in more peaceful situations, when cooperative individu-
als decide on collective behaviour. Social hierarchy is also involved in determining 
relationships between group members [34]. 
Hierarchy may emerge of itself. Ohnishi [35] simulated the evolution of hierarchi-
cally structured groups by letting agents interact asymmetrically and exchanging 
“power” consisting of material and/or information. The study showed that distribution 
of power causes a hierarchical structure that will evolve into groups with one or more 
leaders.  
The steepness of hierarchy can be important for the social structure, as shown by 
various studies. Nandi et al. [36] investigated two eu-social species of wasp. De-
creased aggressive (dominance) behaviour of the queen increased complexity in the 
social organisation by change of worker strategies and physiological change (devel-
opment of a pheromone signal). DomWorld, a well-known ABM in biology [37, 38], 
simulates grouping and competition by dominance interactions in primates. In Dom-
World, larger differences in dominance values of individuals cause more despotic 
primate societies, and smaller differences correspond to a more egalitarian society, 
with a different spatial behaviour and gender role distribution. The models have been 
validated against macaque societies of various species. 
Many other animal models have focussed on the emergence of coordination 
through self-organization. Conradt and Roper [39] modelled despotism and democra-
cy as mechanisms for group decision-making.  In most cases, democracy had the low-
est group activity synchronisation (fitness) costs. In a review on decision making 
mechanisms in animals, the importance of differentiating combined from consensus 
decisions was emphasized [40]. A combined decision entails that individuals decide 
individually but their choice will depend on what others do, leading to self-
organization of the group. If an individual can only communicate locally (e.g. as in 
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mob or shoals of fish) consensus cannot be reached and self-organisation will ensue 
[40]. A consensus decision is made in agreement with all group members.  
2.3 Affiliation and hierarchy 
Agent-based architectures quite naturally allow emergent dynamics between affili-
ation and hierarchy. For instance, in social networks the number of ties refers to the 
centrality of an individual within the network. Opinion leaders have relatively many 
connections and therefore more influence [15, 16]. In simulations with a spatial ele-
ment, agents that have a preference for others [19] or that are dominant over others 
[41] may end up in the centre. 
Dávid-Barrett et al. [34] included multi-level networks by making a differentiation 
between optimal personal network size and optimal group size. They investigated, 
under the assumption that individuals want to cooperate, whether the structure of 
interactions affected the choices of the agents to synchronize their behaviour with 
their group members. Interaction limitations by social, spatial or time constraints 
played a key role. An interesting result of this model was that individuals of steeper 
social hierarchical communities needed fewer relationships.  
Primate models also combine affiliation, hierarchy and resulting self-organization. 
King et al. [42] showed that coordination in groups of baboons can be explained by 
simple rules of self-organization. In their ABM they showed the importance of the 
network structure and the relationships between individuals, as individuals are more 
likely to copy and follow the behaviour of their ‘closest friends’. The dominance of 
animals was also included in this study. Rands et al. [43] found that the agent with the 
lowest energetic status often emerged as a temporarily leader for synchronized forag-
ing behaviour. Still, being the highest in rank increases the chance of a successful 
initiation of behaviour and being followed by other individuals [44]. 
3 Discussion 
People are born into a social world, with informal ties of affiliation – “Whom do I 
belong to?” - and hierarchy – “Whom do I defer to?”. ABM show how these ties lead 
to self-organization of social life. Among humans, formal institutions are being creat-
ed to improve upon informal affiliation and hierarchy: to regulate who are colleagues, 
and who are superiors. Therefore, MAS that model formal organizations with con-
cepts such as roles, rules, and norms are obviously useful. Our point is that modelling 
this formal side cannot be an alternative for modelling the informal social world. In-
stead it is a superstructure on top of the informal social world. From informal sources 
we learned that some MAS researchers explicitly disagree with this view, arguing that 
a single formalism is enough to describe social relations. We respond by saying that 
such an attitude limits the potential power of MAS to represent human coordination 
issues. 
Of course not every MAS requires the full range of human sociality. On the contra-
ry: some models convincingly show that social order can emerge without pre-existing 
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affiliation of hierarchy. Depending on the case, more is needed. This should be an 
explicit design-time decision. 
The relationship between the various aspects of affiliation and hierarchy reviewed 
here with our ‘social landscape’ is also far from simple. For instance, opinions might 
or might not be a proxy for deeper-seated group affiliation. People could use opinions 
as group affiliation emblems. There are creativity techniques for groups consisting in 
hiding the identity of contributors precisely because people could otherwise make 
their opinions depend on what their friends said. 
3.1 Social structure in the MAIA architecture 
How does this work out for our example?  
Let us take the example of a boss who may or may not hire child labour. It is 
against the will of the European clients to do so, but it may be in his own interest, and 
it may be perceived as socially desirable in his village. 
MAIA agents live in a world with formal affiliation and hierarchy. Our boss has 
relative power to other members of the organized world, such as the European client, 
and the workers. He (most likely a ‘he’ in the Indian context, but it could be a ‘she’) 
has no formal power over anyone who has not been hired. 
In the current version, the yes/no variable of corruption will decide about the 
boss’s motive for hiring a child, together with a personality variable of risk propensi-
ty. Family, caste, friendship and mutual obligation are not modelled. MAIA’s consti-
tutional structure could perhaps be enhanced to express such relational roles and de-
pendencies; but that might undermine its current clarity or over-stretch its data model. 
In line with [2], a realistic meta-model would need to include relational logic at its 
core, upon which the formal organisational model with its roles and rules would be 
grafted. So perhaps besides the five structures of MAIA, a social structure could be 
created that only dealt with intrinsically social aspects. This would then span the so-
cial landscape in which the agents live. MAIA agents could then also be parents, chil-
dren, or caste members, and have all the unwritten rules that come with these social 
roles, independent of the constitutional structure. Their actions could, in the social 
structure, be evaluated purely for their relational impact. The dynamics of running the 
model would then cause a mutual interdependence between the various structures, 
including the social structure. 
If we create a social structure for this boss, that structure would possibly include 
 A reference group of villagers, including a commitment of the boss to that 
group, and a hierarchical position in that group, and a  measure of the im-
portance of hierarchy – probably related to cultural “power distance” in the 
sense of [45]. 
 A reference group of European clients, also with a commitment of the boss to 
it. Since this is not really a group but rather a category we might not be able to 
give it a power distance.  
 A reference group of the boss himself, representing self-interest. 
The social landscape thus formed can allow the simulation to compute the social 
contributions of the boss’s motivation to hire a child, the expected status gain or pen-
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alty from hiring the child. The formula could use: the sum of (his commitment to each 
reference group * that reference group’s power * that reference group’s pressure). 
To determine whether the boss will actually hire a child, the social structure could 
be combined with factors that MAIA already models: personality characteristics of 
the boss, and that boss’s formal authority about hiring. Note that there would need to 
be a mechanism for determining the relative salience of the informal and formal 
world.  
As a “use case”, the outcome of adding a social structure could be that one boss 
stops hiring children after a personal visit from a European client, not for formal rea-
sons, but because the client visit honoured him so much that it increased his commit-
ment to the reference group of European clients, which gave more weight to their 
rules.  
 
The literature reviewed here can help designers think about the architecture of the 
social structure. In this paper we shall not attempt to design it, but just put forward 
suggested directions for development. In the case of MAIA, adopting for instance a 
social network, we could think of the boss making more social comparisons to the 
extent that he is uncertain, that is, looking at what other bosses in the recycle industry 
are doing. The decision by other bosses to hire children or not, can be a reason for the 
boss to follow this behaviour. If we also have hierarchy in our social structure we can 
let the other persons’ influence depend on whether he looks up to them (for example 
because they have more or better connections, are senior family, or because their 
companies are bigger). The hierarchical structure of the society may also be important 
for individual decision making. In a more despotic society, the boss will probably 
decide on this issue himself, or be forced from above. If the structure is more egalitar-
ian, the decision could be democratic. If in addition to all of this, we adopt reference 
groups, then the influence of the visit by the EU client can also be placed in the bal-
ance. 
The point is not whether these ideas would be the best to adopt for MAIA, for after 
implementing and testing with local people they would no doubt turn out to be 
flawed; but to show that an intrinsically social landscape for agents can increase their 
usefulness. MAIA is just one case of the general argument here: meta-models of for-
mal organizational structures can be populated with agents that are intrinsically social 
and cultural, and this combination is needed for progress. 
3.1 Further research 
The literature review, though far from complete,  indicates that although models on 
group affiliation exist for both humans and animals, there is hardly any work on hier-
archy or dominance among humans. It is quite possible that power is too much a ta-
boo among humans. Few people are willing to admit to dominance or submission 
motives in themselves, although they do impute them to others. The issue will not be 
solved by ignoring it though. Robots and virtual agents are beginning to permeate 
people’s lives. The biggest obstacle today is their lack of sociality [2]. Insights from 
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the ABM literature reviewed here can help remedy this situation. The task ahead is 
still vast though, and decades of work will be needed.  
Our literature survey shows a very modest contribution of social science that leaves 
room for a lot of experimentation. The typical focus on mechanism in ABM leads to 
an easier connection with biology than with psychology or sociology. The focus on 
logic in MAS seems at variance with the preoccupations of social scientists. 
One issue apparent from the literature review is that self-organization, studied with 
very convincing results in many species of animals, has not been much used to study 
the emergence of patterns in human societies. This seems a really promising area of 
study. 
The suggestion to have both an informal social world and a formal, institutional 
one in a simulation begs a question. How would the system decide how to weight 
informal social logic against formal organizational rule? Actually, a lot can be 
gleaned about this from cross-cultural studies that could be incorporated. Culture 
consists of the answers that a society has found to the coordination tasks it faces in 
order to divide social resources and avoid infighting. Dimensions of culture [45] that 
have emerged time and again in studies that compare values between societies revolve 
around issues of affiliation (individualism – collectivism) and hierarchy (masculinity, 
power distance). They can be used in ABM for comparing coordination issues across 
countries. 
Many ABMs show that self-organization is an important force. This also offers re-
search opportunities: how can an agent world self-organize while subject to formal 
norms and rules? How could changes in the informal social world affect the fate of 
formal organizations? How can the socio-cultural world co-evolve with the formal 
institutional world?  
Another untouched issue is how the physical world impinges upon the social 
world, for instance through selective perception. Here, Kaminka’s [1] ideas can serve. 
Finally, a re-examination of social science for useful theory that might have been 
left unused by the ABM research is a major endeavour left untouched in this article. A 
recent example of this is [46]. In that paper, the agents are intrinsically social but live 
in an undifferentiated world; adding formal institutions and / or physical structure to 
their world, or perhaps rather adding this social world to existing other models, would 
be a valuable next step. 
4 Conclusions 
This paper argued 1) that group affiliation and hierarchy are two core issues of co-
ordination among humans; 2) that current MAS work pays little attention to their real-
world complexity; 3) that there are ample sources of inspiration in the ABM litera-
ture; 4) that social scientific theory has been little used in that literature.  
A finding from the literature is that dominance has been understudied in ABM of 
humans. ABM about animal societies, with ideas useful for modelling humans, make 
up for that. Numerous other concepts of affiliation and hierarchy are mentioned, rang-
ing from none – where it is self-organization that leads to coordination – to generical-
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ly social, to specialized in a single area such as opinion dynamics. The authors hope 
to inspire researchers in social simulation and MAS to re-use these ideas, so that they 
will fill their clever designs with social agents. We are just getting started.   
Furthermore, the article posits that it could be fruitful to provide social agents with 
both a formal structure of group belonging and hierarchy, such as an organization 
structure, and an informal one that is constituted by their nature as social and cultural 
beings but not encoded in formal roles. The former provides the stick to beat the dog 
with, whereas the latter provides the reason. As a result, the same formal structure 
populated by different people will yield different results. 
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